Election Timing and the Electoral Influence of Interest Groups

• Published in: The Journal of politics 2011-04, Vol.73 (2), p.412-427
• Main Author: Anzia, Sarah F.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Boards of education; Districts; Elections; Electoral districts; Interest Groups; Local elections; Political interest groups; Political Systems; Presidential elections; School Districts; State elections; Teacher salaries; Teachers; Unions; Voter behavior; Voter Turnout; Voting Behavior
• ISSN: 0022-3816; 1468-2508
• DOI: 10.1017/S0022381611000028

It is an established fact that off-cycle elections attract lower voter turnout than on-cycle elections. I argue that the decrease in turnout that accompanies off-cycle election timing creates a strategic opportunity for organized interest groups. Members of interest groups with a large stake in an election outcome turn out at high rates regardless of election timing, and their efforts to mobilize and persuade voters have a greater impact when turnout is low. Consequently, policy made by officials elected in off-cycle elections should be more favorable to the dominant interest group in a polity than policy made by officials elected in on-cycle elections. I test this theory using data on school district elections in the United States, in which teacher unions are the dominant interest group. I find that districts with off-cycle elections pay experienced teachers over 3% more than districts that hold on-cycle elections.