China's Afghan Dilemma

The announcement that American forces in Afghanistan would start to draw down by July 2011 highlighted, for China, the need for a conversation about what exactly its interests in its neighbour are, and what it is willing to do about them. Beijing's primary security concern with Afghanistan is t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Survival (London) 2010-08, Vol.52 (4), p.21-27
Main Author: Pantucci, Raffaello
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Afghanistan
Afghanistan War
Asian cultural groups
Bargaining
China
Conflict
Conversation
Foreign Policy
Foreign relations
Imperialism
International organizations
International relations
Islam
Militancy
Military deployment
Military policy
National security
Peace negotiations
Peoples Republic of China
Planners
Regional security
Risk
Separatism
Terrorism
Threat
Uyghur people
War on terror
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Summary:The announcement that American forces in Afghanistan would start to draw down by July 2011 highlighted, for China, the need for a conversation about what exactly its interests in its neighbour are, and what it is willing to do about them. Beijing's primary security concern with Afghanistan is the potential that instability and terrorism might be exported to China's far-western Xinjiang province, where the ethno-separatist tendencies of the large Uighur Muslim minority have in the past been linked to al-Qaeda militancy. Currently, China is reliant on the United States and NATO to deal with Uighur separatists within Afghanistan, which occurs as a by-product of operations against the Afghan Taliban and related groups. Many Chinese analysts remain unconvinced that NATO will succeed. Most see Afghanistan as the 'graveyard of Empires', an assessment they gleefully share with foreign analysts, and which captures a residual sense amongst some Chinese planners who see the United States as an enemy whose losses are advantages to Beijing. Operating from this strategic calculus means that China must be prepared for the eventuality that NATO forces will leave Afghanistan in the control of Taliban or affiliated groups. Beijing has no interest, therefore, in appearing to take sides against the Taliban and finding itself in an awkward bargaining position after an American withdrawal. And beyond Afghanistan, there is the risk that China might be perceived as taking sides in the global conflict between Islam and the West.
ISSN:0039-6338
1468-2699
DOI:10.1080/00396338.2010.506813