The representation of freedom in decisions: Good outcomes or real choice?

Five studies replicate and extend recent experimental findings on a divergence between theoretical and subjectively-experienced decision freedom. While conditions like conflict, uncertainty, or complexity are structural indicators of free choice, they empirically decrease experienced freedom. Subjec...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophical psychology 2020-05, Vol.33 (4), p.592-623
Main Authors: Lau, Stephan, Walter, Sophia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
decision-making
Experience of freedom
free choice
qualitative methods
self-determination
underdetermination
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Summary:Five studies replicate and extend recent experimental findings on a divergence between theoretical and subjectively-experienced decision freedom. While conditions like conflict, uncertainty, or complexity are structural indicators of free choice, they empirically decrease experienced freedom. Subjective freedom itself seems to depend on easy decisions with positive outcomes of a high certainty. Studies 1 and 2 conceptually replicate this strong focus of subjective freedom on positive valence by using semantic and qualitative data. The replication proved successful. Given this prevalence of positivity, Studies 3, 4, and 5 proceed to test the hypothesis that people do not recognize features of free choice beyond their positive feeling. This hypothesis was disconfirmed: although participants experienced decision conflicts as uncertain and less free, they judged higher conflict as less determined, more open, unpredictable, and more contingent on the personality of the decider. We discuss resulting hypotheses and a necessary differentiation in the representation of freedom.
ISSN:0951-5089
1465-394X
DOI:10.1080/09515089.2020.1742877