Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule

Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of err...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Global economic review 2022-01, Vol.51 (1), p.1-17
Main Authors: Kim, Duk Gyoo, Lee, Jinhyuk, Shin, Euncheol
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Collective decision
Editing
Errors
Fines & penalties
Majority rule
optimal proofreading
optimal voting rule
qualified majority rule
representative agent
Voting rules
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
cited_by
cites cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-d63ec8b3c095ea8f347fecfbe9e526e9b483a579d6a5ede8839bbc67aa3165f83
container_end_page 17
container_issue 1
container_start_page 1
container_title Global economic review
container_volume 51
creator Kim, Duk Gyoo
Lee, Jinhyuk
Shin, Euncheol
description Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.
doi_str_mv 10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379
format article
fullrecord <record><control><sourceid>proquest_cross</sourceid><recordid>TN_cdi_crossref_primary_10_1080_1226508X_2022_2040379</recordid><sourceformat>XML</sourceformat><sourcesystem>PC</sourcesystem><sourcerecordid>2631745253</sourcerecordid><originalsourceid>FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-d63ec8b3c095ea8f347fecfbe9e526e9b483a579d6a5ede8839bbc67aa3165f83</originalsourceid><addsrcrecordid>eNp9UE1LxDAQDaLguvoThILnrkmmSdObsvgFCyui4i2k6US7dJs1zSr7701ZvXqZGR7vvZl5hJwzOmNU0UvGuRRUvc045TyVgkJZHZAJK4siB1XCYZoTJx9Jx-RkGFaUJpyxCYG57zq0sf3C7DF47wKapu3fM9M3WfzAbLmJ7dp02auPI_y07fCUHDnTDXj226fk5fbmeX6fL5Z3D_PrRW6hlDFvJKBVNVhaCTTKQVE6tK7GCgWXWNWFAiPKqpFGYINKQVXXVpbGAJPCKZiSi73vJvjPLQ5Rr_w29Gml5hLSd4ILSCyxZ9nghyGg05uQLg47zage89F_-egxH_2bT9Jd7XVt73xYm28fukZHs-t8cMH0th00_G_xA36WbD0</addsrcrecordid><sourcetype>Aggregation Database</sourcetype><iscdi>true</iscdi><recordtype>article</recordtype><pqid>2631745253</pqid></control><display><type>article</type><title>Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule</title><source>EconLit s plnými texty</source><source>EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate</source><source>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</source><source>Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection</source><creator>Kim, Duk Gyoo ; Lee, Jinhyuk ; Shin, Euncheol</creator><creatorcontrib>Kim, Duk Gyoo ; Lee, Jinhyuk ; Shin, Euncheol</creatorcontrib><description>Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.</description><identifier>ISSN: 1226-508X</identifier><identifier>EISSN: 1744-3873</identifier><identifier>DOI: 10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379</identifier><language>eng</language><publisher>Abingdon: Routledge</publisher><subject>Collective decision ; Editing ; Errors ; Fines &amp; penalties ; Majority rule ; optimal proofreading ; optimal voting rule ; qualified majority rule ; representative agent ; Voting rules</subject><ispartof>Global economic review, 2022-01, Vol.51 (1), p.1-17</ispartof><rights>2022 Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul 2022</rights><rights>2022 Institute of East and West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul</rights><lds50>peer_reviewed</lds50><woscitedreferencessubscribed>false</woscitedreferencessubscribed><cites>FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-d63ec8b3c095ea8f347fecfbe9e526e9b483a579d6a5ede8839bbc67aa3165f83</cites><orcidid>0000-0002-6053-4050 ; 0000-0002-8906-5630 ; 0000-0003-0941-3947</orcidid></display><links><openurl>$$Topenurl_article</openurl><openurlfulltext>$$Topenurlfull_article</openurlfulltext><thumbnail>$$Tsyndetics_thumb_exl</thumbnail><link.rule.ids>314,776,780,27903,27904</link.rule.ids></links><search><creatorcontrib>Kim, Duk Gyoo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lee, Jinhyuk</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shin, Euncheol</creatorcontrib><title>Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule</title><title>Global economic review</title><description>Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.</description><subject>Collective decision</subject><subject>Editing</subject><subject>Errors</subject><subject>Fines &amp; penalties</subject><subject>Majority rule</subject><subject>optimal proofreading</subject><subject>optimal voting rule</subject><subject>qualified majority rule</subject><subject>representative agent</subject><subject>Voting rules</subject><issn>1226-508X</issn><issn>1744-3873</issn><fulltext>true</fulltext><rsrctype>article</rsrctype><creationdate>2022</creationdate><recordtype>article</recordtype><sourceid>7UB</sourceid><recordid>eNp9UE1LxDAQDaLguvoThILnrkmmSdObsvgFCyui4i2k6US7dJs1zSr7701ZvXqZGR7vvZl5hJwzOmNU0UvGuRRUvc045TyVgkJZHZAJK4siB1XCYZoTJx9Jx-RkGFaUJpyxCYG57zq0sf3C7DF47wKapu3fM9M3WfzAbLmJ7dp02auPI_y07fCUHDnTDXj226fk5fbmeX6fL5Z3D_PrRW6hlDFvJKBVNVhaCTTKQVE6tK7GCgWXWNWFAiPKqpFGYINKQVXXVpbGAJPCKZiSi73vJvjPLQ5Rr_w29Gml5hLSd4ILSCyxZ9nghyGg05uQLg47zage89F_-egxH_2bT9Jd7XVt73xYm28fukZHs-t8cMH0th00_G_xA36WbD0</recordid><startdate>20220102</startdate><enddate>20220102</enddate><creator>Kim, Duk Gyoo</creator><creator>Lee, Jinhyuk</creator><creator>Shin, Euncheol</creator><general>Routledge</general><general>Taylor &amp; Francis Ltd</general><scope>AAYXX</scope><scope>CITATION</scope><scope>7UB</scope><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6053-4050</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8906-5630</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0941-3947</orcidid></search><sort><creationdate>20220102</creationdate><title>Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule</title><author>Kim, Duk Gyoo ; Lee, Jinhyuk ; Shin, Euncheol</author></sort><facets><frbrtype>5</frbrtype><frbrgroupid>cdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-d63ec8b3c095ea8f347fecfbe9e526e9b483a579d6a5ede8839bbc67aa3165f83</frbrgroupid><rsrctype>articles</rsrctype><prefilter>articles</prefilter><language>eng</language><creationdate>2022</creationdate><topic>Collective decision</topic><topic>Editing</topic><topic>Errors</topic><topic>Fines &amp; penalties</topic><topic>Majority rule</topic><topic>optimal proofreading</topic><topic>optimal voting rule</topic><topic>qualified majority rule</topic><topic>representative agent</topic><topic>Voting rules</topic><toplevel>peer_reviewed</toplevel><toplevel>online_resources</toplevel><creatorcontrib>Kim, Duk Gyoo</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Lee, Jinhyuk</creatorcontrib><creatorcontrib>Shin, Euncheol</creatorcontrib><collection>CrossRef</collection><collection>Worldwide Political Science Abstracts</collection><jtitle>Global economic review</jtitle></facets><delivery><delcategory>Remote Search Resource</delcategory><fulltext>fulltext</fulltext></delivery><addata><au>Kim, Duk Gyoo</au><au>Lee, Jinhyuk</au><au>Shin, Euncheol</au><format>journal</format><genre>article</genre><ristype>JOUR</ristype><atitle>Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule</atitle><jtitle>Global economic review</jtitle><date>2022-01-02</date><risdate>2022</risdate><volume>51</volume><issue>1</issue><spage>1</spage><epage>17</epage><pages>1-17</pages><issn>1226-508X</issn><eissn>1744-3873</eissn><abstract>Policy decisions often involve a repeated proofreading process before implementation. We present a dynamic model of proofreading decisions by a heterogeneous committee before implementing a risky policy. The proofreading process is necessary because the risky policy contains an unknown number of errors. Proofreading continues as long as a qualified majority votes for continuation. Once the proofreading process ends, and the policy is implemented, members receive heterogeneous penalties based on the remaining errors. We characterize the optimal voting rule given the costs and penalties for the committee. We find that any qualified voting rule, including majority rule, for proofreading is inefficient.</abstract><cop>Abingdon</cop><pub>Routledge</pub><doi>10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379</doi><tpages>17</tpages><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-6053-4050</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0002-8906-5630</orcidid><orcidid>https://orcid.org/0000-0003-0941-3947</orcidid></addata></record>
fulltext fulltext
identifier ISSN: 1226-508X
ispartof Global economic review, 2022-01, Vol.51 (1), p.1-17
issn 1226-508X
1744-3873
language eng
recordid cdi_crossref_primary_10_1080_1226508X_2022_2040379
source EconLit s plnými texty; EBSCOhost Business Source Ultimate; Worldwide Political Science Abstracts; Taylor and Francis Social Sciences and Humanities Collection
subjects Collective decision
Editing
Errors
Fines & penalties
Majority rule
optimal proofreading
optimal voting rule
qualified majority rule
representative agent
Voting rules
title Collective Proofreading and the Optimal Voting Rule
url http://sfxeu10.hosted.exlibrisgroup.com/loughborough?ctx_ver=Z39.88-2004&ctx_enc=info:ofi/enc:UTF-8&ctx_tim=2025-01-23T11%3A27%3A54IST&url_ver=Z39.88-2004&url_ctx_fmt=infofi/fmt:kev:mtx:ctx&rfr_id=info:sid/primo.exlibrisgroup.com:primo3-Article-proquest_cross&rft_val_fmt=info:ofi/fmt:kev:mtx:journal&rft.genre=article&rft.atitle=Collective%20Proofreading%20and%20the%20Optimal%20Voting%20Rule&rft.jtitle=Global%20economic%20review&rft.au=Kim,%20Duk%20Gyoo&rft.date=2022-01-02&rft.volume=51&rft.issue=1&rft.spage=1&rft.epage=17&rft.pages=1-17&rft.issn=1226-508X&rft.eissn=1744-3873&rft_id=info:doi/10.1080/1226508X.2022.2040379&rft_dat=%3Cproquest_cross%3E2631745253%3C/proquest_cross%3E%3Cgrp_id%3Ecdi_FETCH-LOGICAL-c376t-d63ec8b3c095ea8f347fecfbe9e526e9b483a579d6a5ede8839bbc67aa3165f83%3C/grp_id%3E%3Coa%3E%3C/oa%3E%3Curl%3E%3C/url%3E&rft_id=info:oai/&rft_pqid=2631745253&rft_id=info:pmid/&rfr_iscdi=true