The Watchdog or the Mandarin? Assessing the impact of the Directorates General on the EU legislative process

This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: 'the Watchdog' and 'the Mandarin' of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of European public policy 2019-03, Vol.26 (3), p.407-427
Main Author: Ershova, Anastasia
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Bureaucracy
Decision making
Directorates general
discretionary limits
EU commission
legislative politics
Legislative process
Legislators
Preferences
principal-agent
Principals
Proximity
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Summary:This article assesses the role of the Directorates Generals (DGs) led by the Commissioners in the EU legislative decision-making by testing two perspectives: 'the Watchdog' and 'the Mandarin' of the EU principals. The former suggests that a conflict of preferences between the DGs will notify the EU principals of prospective bureaucratic drift, leading to more restrictive discretionary limits imposed on the Commission in the implementation stage. However, if the lead DG acts as the Mandarin, proximity of its preference to the EU principals should result in more executive leeway as its policy preference is more beneficial for the EU legislators. To tests the conjunctions, this study focuses on two dimensions of EU political space: Left-Right (LR) and Pro/Anti-EU. The results suggest that the legislators will indulge the Commission with more leeway for the implementation when their preferences are more congruent with the position of the lead DG on the LR dimension, thus supporting 'the Mandarin' perspective.
ISSN:1350-1763
1466-4429
DOI:10.1080/13501763.2018.1447009