Cognitive and neural components of the phenomenology of agency

A primary aspect of the self is the sense of agency - the sense that one is causing an action. In the spirit of recent reductionistic approaches to other complex, multifaceted phenomena (e.g., working memory; cf. Johnson & Johnson, 2009) , we attempt to unravel the sense of agency by investigati...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Neurocase 2011-06, Vol.17 (3), p.209-230
Main Authors: Morsella, Ezequiel, Berger, Christopher C., Krieger, Stephen C.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Brain - physiology
Cognition - physiology
Cognitive control
Conflict (Psychology)
Conscious conflict
Consciousness - physiology
Executive Function - physiology
Humans
Perception - physiology
Phenomenology
Phenomenology of agency
Self consciousness
Self Efficacy
Sense of agency
Volition
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Summary:A primary aspect of the self is the sense of agency - the sense that one is causing an action. In the spirit of recent reductionistic approaches to other complex, multifaceted phenomena (e.g., working memory; cf. Johnson & Johnson, 2009) , we attempt to unravel the sense of agency by investigating its most basic components, without invoking high-level conceptual or 'central executive' processes. After considering the high-level components of agency, we examine the cognitive and neural underpinnings of its low-level components, which include basic consciousness and subjective urges (e.g., the urge to breathe when holding one's breath). Regarding urges, a quantitative review revealed that certain inter-representational dynamics (conflicts between action plans, as when holding one's breath) reliably engender fundamental aspects both of the phenomenology of agency and of 'something countering the will of the self'. The neural correlates of such dynamics, for both primordial urges (e.g., air hunger) and urges elicited in laboratory interference tasks, are entertained. In addition, we discuss the implications of this unique perspective for the study of disorders involving agency.
ISSN:1355-4794
1465-3656
1362-4970
DOI:10.1080/13554794.2010.504727