‘Ramseyfying’ Probabilistic Comparativism

Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). I outline the basis for a new, nonprobabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophy of science 2020-10, Vol.87 (4), p.727-754
Main Author: Elliott, Edward
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Coherence
Statistical analysis
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Summary:Comparativism is the view that comparative confidences (e.g., being more confident that P than that Q) are more fundamental than degrees of belief (e.g., believing that P with some strength x). I outline the basis for a new, nonprobabilistic version of comparativism inspired by a suggestion made by Frank Ramsey in “Probability and Partial Belief.” I show how, and to what extent, ‘Ramseyan comparativism’ might be used to weaken the (unrealistically strong) probabilistic coherence conditions that comparativism traditionally relies on.
ISSN:0031-8248
1539-767X
DOI:10.1086/709785