Concentrated Ownership, State-Owned Enterprises and Corporate Governance

Concentrated ownership companies are increasing worldwide, a significant percentage of which are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose controller is the government. Government owners are the world’s second largest type of shareholder. Despite extensive literature on SOEs, there is little analysis of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Oxford journal of legal studies 2021-09, Vol.41 (3), p.663-691
Main Author: Lim, Ernest W K
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Concentrated ownership companies are increasing worldwide, a significant percentage of which are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), whose controller is the government. Government owners are the world’s second largest type of shareholder. Despite extensive literature on SOEs, there is little analysis of how corporate governance can be undermined by the state as the controller of SOEs or how it can be deployed by the government to serve its own ends. This article critically examines how the conflict of interest between the government as the controller of SOEs on the one hand and the minority shareholders and stakeholders on the other, as well as the conflict of interest between the government as the controller on the one hand and the government as the regulator on the other, can affect three corporate governance regimes, namely, sustainability (environmental, social and governance) reporting; directors’ duty to act in the best interests of the company; and stewardship code.
ISSN:0143-6503
1464-3820
DOI:10.1093/ojls/gqaa050