Epidemic Population Games and Perturbed Best Response Dynamics

This article proposes an approach to mitigate epidemic spread in a population of strategic agents by encouraging safer behaviors through carefully designed rewards. These rewards, which adapt to the evolving state of the epidemic, are ascribed by a dynamic payoff mechanism we seek to design. We use...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on automatic control 2025-09, Vol.70 (9), p.6036-6049
Main Authors: Park, Shinkyu, Certorio, Jair, Martins, Nuno C., La, Richard J.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Costs
Decision making
Disease control
Epidemic
Epidemics
evolutionary dynamics
Game theory
Liapunov functions
Lyapunov methods
Lyapunov stability
Parameters
population games
Switches
Systems theory
Training
Upper bound
Upper bounds
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