Parameter-Estimate-First False Data Injection Attacks in AC State Estimation Deployed With Moving Target Defense

Enabled by the widely deployed distributed flexible alternating current transmission system (D-FACTS) devices in practical systems, moving target defense (MTD) has been considered as an effective way to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks by actively changing branch parameters. Howeve...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on circuits and systems. I, Regular papers Regular papers, 2024-04, Vol.71 (4), p.1842-1851
Main Authors: Liu, Chensheng, Li, Yuanqi, Zhu, Hongcheng, Tang, Yang, Du, Wenli
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
AC state estimation
Admittance
Alternating current
Current measurement
Detectors
Flexible AC power transmission systems
Moving target defense
Moving targets
Parameter estimation
parameter-estimate-first attack
Reactive power
State estimation
Stealth technology
System effectiveness
Threat modeling
Voltage measurement
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Summary:Enabled by the widely deployed distributed flexible alternating current transmission system (D-FACTS) devices in practical systems, moving target defense (MTD) has been considered as an effective way to detect stealthy false data injection (FDI) attacks by actively changing branch parameters. However, existing MTD methods heavily depend on the assumption that opponents can not timely obtain the newly changed branch parameters. In this paper, a parameter-estimate-first FDI (PEF-FDI) attack is proposed to reveal vulnerabilities of MTD methods in AC state estimation, which can bypass bad data detectors in the existence of MTD. Specifically, a PEF-FDI attack model is proposed to timely construct attack vector and stealthily misguide the results of alternating current (AC) state estimation in the presence of MTD. Requirements of constructing PEF-FDI attacks on eavesdropped measurements are deduced to reveal the limitation on capability of attackers. Simulations in the IEEE 118-bus system verify the performance of the proposed PEF-FDI attacks.
ISSN:1549-8328
1558-0806
DOI:10.1109/TCSI.2024.3350242