Authentication of Digital Streams

We study the multicast stream authentication problem when the communication channel is under control of an opponent who can drop, reorder and inject data packets. Recently, many coding theory based protocols have been developed to treat the stream authentication problem over such a channel. In this...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on information theory 2011-09, Vol.57 (9), p.6285-6303
Main Authors: Tartary, Christophe, Huaxiong Wang, San Ling
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Adversarial network
Algorithm design and analysis
Applied sciences
Authentication
Authentication protocols
Coding theory
Coding, codes
Communication channels
Cryptography
Decoding
Exact sciences and technology
Information theory
Information, signal and communications theory
list recoverable codes
polynomial reconstruction problem
Polynomials
Protocols
Receivers
Reed-Solomon codes
Signal and communications theory
stream authentication
Systems, networks and services of telecommunications
Telecommunications
Telecommunications and information theory
Transmission and modulation (techniques and equipments)
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Summary:We study the multicast stream authentication problem when the communication channel is under control of an opponent who can drop, reorder and inject data packets. Recently, many coding theory based protocols have been developed to treat the stream authentication problem over such a channel. In this paper, our goal is to provide a general coding approach for multicast stream authentication. We design an authentication protocol which combines any list recoverable code (provided some conditions on its construction parameters). We demonstrate that the previous schemes can be viewed as instances of our construction when a Reed-Solomon code is used as a list recoverable code. In such settings, we also show that our approach leads to a better upper bound on the number of signature verification queries for each receiver.
ISSN:0018-9448
1557-9654
DOI:10.1109/TIT.2011.2161960