Learning an Adversary's Actions for Secret Communication

Secure communication over a wiretap channel is investigated, in which an active adversary modifies the state of the channel and the legitimate transmitter has the opportunity to sense and learn the adversary's actions. The adversary has the ability to switch the channel state and observe the co...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on information theory 2020-03, Vol.66 (3), p.1607-1624
Main Authors: Tahmasbi, Mehrdad, Bloch, Matthieu R., Yener, Aylin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
arbitrarily varying channel
Channel models
Coders
Environmental monitoring
Information-theoretic security
Jamming
Learning
Monitoring
Nonlinear Sciences
Security
Signal to noise ratio
Switches
Transmitters
Wiretapping
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Summary:Secure communication over a wiretap channel is investigated, in which an active adversary modifies the state of the channel and the legitimate transmitter has the opportunity to sense and learn the adversary's actions. The adversary has the ability to switch the channel state and observe the corresponding output at every channel use while the encoder has causal access to observations that depend on the adversary's actions. A joint learning/transmission scheme is developed in which the legitimate users learn and adapt to the adversary's actions. For some channel models, it is shown that the achievable rates, defined precisely for the problem, are arbitrarily close to those obtained with hindsight, had the transmitter known the actions ahead of time. This initial study suggests that there is much to exploit and gain in physical-layer security by learning the adversary, e.g., monitoring the environment.
ISSN:0018-9448
1557-9654
DOI:10.1109/TIT.2019.2940960