Pathways to Stability for Transition Governments in the M iddle E ast and N orth A frica

• Published in: Asian politics & policy 2015-01, Vol.7 (1), p.5-38
• Main Authors: Kugler, Jacek, Bagherpour, Amir, Abdollahian, Mark, Singer, Ashraf
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• ISSN: 1943-0779; 1943-0787
• DOI: 10.1111/aspp.12170

Selectorate theory posits that within each society, there is a political selectorate containing a winning coalition. This coalition, comprised of societal individuals, groups, and entities, selects the national leader whose aim is political survival. The original version of the theory suggested that the selectorate expands in step with the ability of the leader to provide private or public goods to its supporters in various combinations. This study expands selectorate theory to the recent revolutions across M iddle E ast and N orth A frica ( MENA ). With various regimes optimizing economic allocations, we believe that political survival in MENA societies is gained and maintained by concurrently fulfilling rising religious preferences. Stable MENA regimes also meet religious demands. Thus, leaders that ignore religious tides do so at their own peril. Addressing religious demands as the selectorate expands maximizes stability and reduces autocratic tendencies. We present selectorate and stakeholder assessments of six MENA societies during the A rab S pring. We find that selectorate expansion, regime stability, and regime survival depend as much on religiosity as on private–public payoffs optimization. Our results have striking implications for democratic preference promulgation and regime stability.