Is Agent-Causal Libertarianism Unintelligible?: The Problem of Uniqueness and Ontological Commitments

Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Philosophia reformata 2020-03, Vol.85 (1), p.1-19
Main Author: Mizell, Stephen D.
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:Critics often charge that agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible due to the uniqueness of agent-causation—the sui generis causal relationship said to be involved when agents make free choices. This paper presents five objections, which are taken to be the only good objections, to agent-causal libertarianism and argues they all fail to show agent-causal libertarianism is unintelligible. The first four objections fail outright. The fifth objection fails in a special way. Naturalistic agent-causal libertarian theories succumb to this fifth objection; theistic agent-causal libertarian theories do not. This entails that if agent-causal libertarianism is intelligible, then it is only so within theism.
ISSN:0031-8035
0031-8035
DOI:10.1163/23528230-08501001