Do Family Owners Hold Nonfamily CEOs More Accountable Than Family CEOs for Firm Performance? A Dynamic Perspective

This study investigates whether family owners consider the stages of CEO tenure in their use of firm performance to assess CEOs. Integrating insights on family owners’ long-term orientation and stages of CEO tenure, we theorize that family owners rely more on firm performance to make CEO replacement...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Family business review 2024-09, Vol.37 (3), p.347-369
Main Authors: Shen, Wei, Gu, Qian (Cecilia), Lu, Lin-Hua
Format: Article
Language:English
Citations: Items that this one cites
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:This study investigates whether family owners consider the stages of CEO tenure in their use of firm performance to assess CEOs. Integrating insights on family owners’ long-term orientation and stages of CEO tenure, we theorize that family owners rely more on firm performance to make CEO replacement decisions during the mid-stage of CEO tenure than during the early and late stages. Moreover, we predict that they hold nonfamily CEOs more accountable for firm performance than family CEOs only during the mid-stage of CEO tenure. Using data from family-controlled firms in Taiwan, we found empirical evidence supportive of our theoretical predictions.
ISSN:0894-4865
1741-6248
DOI:10.1177/08944865241273370