Berkeley’s Apparent Cartesianism in De Motu

In this paper, I aim to explain Berkeley’s sudden endorsement of Descartes’ distinction between mind and body in De Motu. This approval of Cartesianism has been seen as disingenuous by several recent commentators. On the contrary, I shall argue that Berkeley’s claims here are consistent with his ‘im...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 2012-10, Vol.94 (3), p.353-366
Main Author: Storrie, Stefan Sean Gordon
Format: Article
Language:English
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:In this paper, I aim to explain Berkeley’s sudden endorsement of Descartes’ distinction between mind and body in De Motu. This approval of Cartesianism has been seen as disingenuous by several recent commentators. On the contrary, I shall argue that Berkeley’s claims here are consistent with his ‘immaterialism’ and are in accordance with his conception of the distinction between natural science and metaphysics. I will conclude by explaining how to understand Berkeley’s turn not only towards modern, but also towards ancient authorities. Likewise, I will argue that in De Motu, Berkeley begins his quest of redescribing his ‘immaterialist’ philosophy as part of an ancient philosophical tradition, an enterprise that dominates his later works, Alciphron and Siris.
ISSN:0003-9101
1613-0650
DOI:10.1515/agph-2012-0015