Enkratēs Phronimos

This paper challenges the widespread assumption that the strong-willed person, the enkratēs, cannot have Aristotle’s virtue of practical wisdom (phronēsis). It argues that the attribution of phronēsis to the enkratēs is needed to make sense of (1) Aristotle’s praise of both the rational and the irra...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Archiv für Geschichte der Philosophie 2017-03, Vol.99 (1), p.31-63
Main Author: Callard, Agnes
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:This paper challenges the widespread assumption that the strong-willed person, the enkratēs, cannot have Aristotle’s virtue of practical wisdom (phronēsis). It argues that the attribution of phronēsis to the enkratēs is needed to make sense of (1) Aristotle’s praise of both the rational and the irrational part of the enkratēs’ soul, (2) Aristotle’s conception of the weak-willed person (the akratēs) as ignorant and as lacking the particular premise, (3) Aristotle’s conception of phronēsis in Nicomachean Ethics VI.5–9. Furthermore, it shows that the claim that the enkratēs is phronimos is consistent with Aristotle’s doctrine of the unity of the virtues, as expressed in VI.12–13.
ISSN:0003-9101
1613-0650
DOI:10.1515/agph-2017-0002