Essentially Comparative Concepts

This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an ‘essentially comparative’ concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central eth...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of ethics & social philosophy 2017-06, Vol.1 (2), p.1-16
Main Author: Dancy, Jonathan
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:This paper examines Larry Temkin’s notion of an ‘essentially comparative’ concept and the uses to which he puts it. It is suggested that this notion is a conflation of two distinct notions which need not go together. This leads to a critical examination of Temkin’s arguments that certain central ethical concepts (equality, maximin, utility) are essentially comparative. These arguments are often found wanting, as is Temkin’s treatment of the Person Affecting View.
ISSN:1559-3061
1559-3061
DOI:10.26556/jesp.v1i2.8