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Integrated game-theory modelling for multi enterprise-wide coordination and collaboration under uncertain competitive environment
•Stackelberg and NE games are integrated in a single Game Theory approach.•The Stackelberg game of non-convex MINLP tactical models are solved.•The game players are represented with their competing 3rd parties.•A novel game theory output is presented as a “Stackelberg set of Pareto frontier”.•The co...
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Published in: | Computers & chemical engineering 2017-03, Vol.98, p.209-235 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | •Stackelberg and NE games are integrated in a single Game Theory approach.•The Stackelberg game of non-convex MINLP tactical models are solved.•The game players are represented with their competing 3rd parties.•A novel game theory output is presented as a “Stackelberg set of Pareto frontier”.•The coordination contracts vs. the “uncertainty reduction cost” are analyzed.
In this work, an integrated Game Theory (GT) approach is developed for the coordination of multi-enterprise Supply Chains (SCs) in a competitive uncertain environment. The conflicting goals of the different participants are solved through coordination contracts using a non-cooperative non-zero-sum Stackelberg game under the leadership of the manufacturer. The Stackelberg payoff matrix is built under the nominal conditions, and then evaluated under different probable uncertain scenarios using a Monte-Carlo simulation. The competition between the Stackelberg game players and the third parties is solved through a Nash Equilibrium game. A novel way to analyze the game outcome is proposed based on a win–win Stackelberg set of “Pareto-frontiers”. The benefits of the resulting MINLP tactical models are illustrated by a case study with different vendors around a client SC. The results show that the coordinated decisions lead to higher expected payoffs compared to the standalone case, while also leading to uncertainty reduction. |
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ISSN: | 0098-1354 1873-4375 |
DOI: | 10.1016/j.compchemeng.2016.11.041 |