Ultra-fast data sanitization of SRAM by back-biasing to resist a cold boot attack

Although SRAM is a well-established type of volatile memory, data remanence has been observed at low temperature even for a power-off state, and thus it is vulnerable to a physical cold boot attack. To address this, an ultra-fast data sanitization method within 5 ns is demonstrated with physics-base...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Scientific reports 2022-01, Vol.12 (1), p.35-35, Article 35
Main Authors: Han, Seong-Joo, Han, Joon-Kyu, Yun, Gyeong-Jun, Lee, Mun-Woo, Yu, Ji-Man, Choi, Yang-Kyu
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
639/166
639/925
Bias
CMOS
Cold
High temperature
Humanities and Social Sciences
Low temperature
multidisciplinary
Physics
Random access memory
Science
Science (multidisciplinary)
Simulation
Transistors
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Summary:Although SRAM is a well-established type of volatile memory, data remanence has been observed at low temperature even for a power-off state, and thus it is vulnerable to a physical cold boot attack. To address this, an ultra-fast data sanitization method within 5 ns is demonstrated with physics-based simulations for avoidance of the cold boot attack to SRAM. Back-bias, which can control device parameters of CMOS, such as threshold voltage and leakage current, was utilized for the ultra-fast data sanitization. It is applicable to temporary erasing with data recoverability against a low-level attack as well as permanent erasing with data irrecoverability against a high-level attack.
ISSN:2045-2322
2045-2322
DOI:10.1038/s41598-021-03994-2