Philosophy against literalism

This article takes the stance that knowledge requires a commitment to literalism, defined as the Humean view that an object is nothing more than a bundle of qualities. But insofar as philosophy in its classical sense as philosophia must oppose all forms of literalism, philosophy cannot be a form of...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Rivista di estetica 2023-01, Vol.84 (84), p.122-136
Main Author: Harman, Graham
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
incommensurability
literalism
object-oriented ontology
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Summary:This article takes the stance that knowledge requires a commitment to literalism, defined as the Humean view that an object is nothing more than a bundle of qualities. But insofar as philosophy in its classical sense as philosophia must oppose all forms of literalism, philosophy cannot be a form of knowledge, and therefore cannot be viewed as continuous with science in any straightforward sense. Analogous cases are considered. A metaphor cannot be understood in literal terms, for the simple reason that metaphor enacts a rift between an object and its qualities rather than a bundled union. Thomas Kuhn’s philosophy of science gives us another case where the “that” and the “what” of a discovery such as oxygen are inevitably in conflict, casting doubt on whether science itself even has literal foundations. The article ends with some reflections on the differing attitudes required by the philosopher and the scientist.
ISSN:0035-6212
2421-5864
DOI:10.4000/estetica.9701