Crosstalk in concurrent repeated games impedes direct reciprocity and requires stronger levels of forgiveness

Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games t...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Nature communications 2018-02, Vol.9 (1), p.555-8, Article 555
Main Authors: Reiter, Johannes G., Hilbe, Christian, Rand, David G., Chatterjee, Krishnendu, Nowak, Martin A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
631/181/2469
631/378/2645/2646
631/477/2811
639/705/1041
Algorithms
Computer Simulation
Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
Crosstalk
Forgiveness
Game Theory
Games
Humanities and Social Sciences
Humans
Interpersonal Relations
Models, Psychological
multidisciplinary
Population structure
Prisoner Dilemma
Reciprocity
Science
Science (multidisciplinary)
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Summary:Direct reciprocity is a mechanism for cooperation among humans. Many of our daily interactions are repeated. We interact repeatedly with our family, friends, colleagues, members of the local and even global community. In the theory of repeated games, it is a tacit assumption that the various games that a person plays simultaneously have no effect on each other. Here we introduce a general framework that allows us to analyze “crosstalk” between a player’s concurrent games. In the presence of crosstalk, the action a person experiences in one game can alter the person’s decision in another. We find that crosstalk impedes the maintenance of cooperation and requires stronger levels of forgiveness. The magnitude of the effect depends on the population structure. In more densely connected social groups, crosstalk has a stronger effect. A harsh retaliator, such as Tit-for-Tat, is unable to counteract crosstalk. The crosstalk framework provides a unified interpretation of direct and upstream reciprocity in the context of repeated games. Social interactions among people are often repeated, and yet it is assumed that simultaneous interactions are independent from one another. Here, Reiter and colleagues describe a conceptual framework where an action in one game can influence the decision in another.
ISSN:2041-1723
2041-1723
DOI:10.1038/s41467-017-02721-8