Transporting the Army for Operation Restore Hope

On December 4, 1992 President Bush gave the order 'to move a substantial American force into Somalia.' Although Army forces contributed substantially to the Joint Task Force, the Army did not dominate the deployments to the degree it did during Operation Desert Storm. Still, by the end of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Kassing, David
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
AIRLIFT OPERATIONS
ARMY OPERATIONS
ARMY PLANNING
CIVIL AFFAIRS
COMMAND AND CONTROL SYSTEMS
CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
DEPLOYMENT
FRICTION(MILITARY OPERATIONS)
Geography
Government and Political Science
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE
HUMANITARIAN DEPLOYMENTS
Humanities and History
JOINT MILITARY ACTIVITIES
LAW ENFORCEMENT
LESSONS LEARNED
Logistics, Military Facilities and Supplies
MARINE TRANSPORTATION
MILITARY FORCES(UNITED STATES)
Military Intelligence
Military Operations, Strategy and Tactics
MILITARY TRANSPORTATION
OOTW(OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR)
PEACEMAKING
PORTS(FACILITIES)
PREPOSITIONING(LOGISTICS)
RESTORE HOPE OPERATION
Sociology and Law
SOMALIA
Unconventional Warfare
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Summary:On December 4, 1992 President Bush gave the order 'to move a substantial American force into Somalia.' Although Army forces contributed substantially to the Joint Task Force, the Army did not dominate the deployments to the degree it did during Operation Desert Storm. Still, by the end of January more than 10,000 Army personnel were on the ground in Somalia, helping tp provide security for relief operations and working to rebuild many of the basic elements of civil society. This report reviews the Army deployment operation. By almost any measure, the transportation of the Army to Somalia can be judged a successful operation. During the first 30 days, 82 percent of the peak U.S. personnel strength and more than half the Army equipment had been delivered. Nonetheless, many participants speak of difficulties and glitches in planning, coordinating and managing the deployments. In spite of these frictions, the nature of the humanitarian mission and the relatively small scale of the deployments (about five percent of Operation Desert Shield/Storm) allowed the deployments to go off without debilitating problems