Homeland Defense: National Guard Bureau Needs to Clarify Civil Support Teams' Mission and Address Management Challenges

• Main Authors: D'Agostino, Davi M, Borseth, Ann, Bendell, Bari L, Bowland, Jaclyn A, Brown, David A, Coffey, Carole F, Cooper, Lee, Kirschbaum, Joseph W, Mayfield, David A, Vance, Walter K
• Format: Report
• Language: English
• Subjects: ADMINISTRATIVE OVERSIGHT; BIOLOGICAL WARFARE AGENTS; CHEMICAL WARFARE AGENTS; Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare; Civil Defense; CIVIL SUPPORT TEAMS; CLARIFICATION; CRISIS MANAGEMENT; EMERGENCIES; EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT PERSONNEL; HOMELAND DEFENSE; LOCAL GOVERNMENT; MANAGEMENT PLANNING AND CONTROL; MASS DESTRUCTION WEAPONS; MILITARY ASSISTANCE; Military Forces and Organizations; MISSIONS; NATIONAL GUARD; NGB(NATIONAL GUARD BUREAU); NON-WMD MISSIONS; Nuclear Weapons; OPERATIONAL READINESS; STATE GOVERNMENT; TEAMS(PERSONNEL)

To prepare for potential attacks in the United States involving weapons of mass destruction (WMD), Congress approved the development of National Guard Civil Support Teams (CST) tasked to identify chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, or high-yield explosive weapons; assess consequences; advise civil authorities on response measures; and assist with requests for additional support. Thus far, 36 of the 55 approved teams have been fully certified to conduct their mission. The National Guard Bureau (NGB) is in the process of establishing, certifying, and planning for the long-term sustainment of the CSTs. GAO was asked to address the extent to which (1) the CSTs are ready to conduct their mission, and (2) effective administrative mechanisms are in place for the CSTs. The established CSTs have thus far been trained, equipped, and staffed and have command and control mechanisms in place to conduct their domestic mission. However, confusion resulting from a lack of guidance on the types of non-WMD missions the CSTs can conduct to prepare for their WMD terrorism mission could impede coordination between state authorities and local emergency management officials on the appropriate use of the CSTs. This lack of clarity has caused confusion among state, local, and NGB officials, potentially slowing coordination efforts. Also, the Department of Defense (DoD) is proposing a limited role for the CSTs to coordinate and operate with Mexican and Canadian officials in the event of a cross-border WMD incident. To ensure the sustainment of CSTs, the Secretary of Defense should work with NGB and the Secretaries of the Army and of the Air Force to clarify the types of non-WMD response efforts that belong in the CST mission; develop guidance to address CST management challenges; and develop guidance and work with state adjutants general to clarify administrative oversight and support structures for CSTs. The Department of Defense (DoD) generally agreed with GAO's recommendations. Report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security, Emerging Threats, and International Relations, Committee on Government Reform, House of Representatives. The original document contains color images.