Chemical Demilitarization: Actions Needed to Improve the Reliability of the Army's Cost Comparison Analysis for Treatment and Disposal Options for Newports VX Hydrolysate

• Main Author: D'Agostino, Davi M
• Format: Report
• Language: English
• Subjects: CHEMICAL DEMILITARIZATION; Chemical, Biological and Radiological Warfare; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; COST ESTIMATES; DEMILITARIZATION; Economics and Cost Analysis; GAO REPORTS; HYDROLYSATE; Industrial Chemistry and Chemical Processing; NEUTRALIZATION; OXIDATION; Physical Chemistry; RELIABILITY; VX AGENT; WASTE TREATMENT; WASTE WATER; Water Pollution and Control

The U.S. stockpile of 1,269 tons of VX nerve agent stored at the Newport Chemical Depot (Newport), Indiana, is one of nine stockpiles that the Department of Defense (DOD) must destroy in response to congressional direction initially provided in 1985. In addition, the stockpile must be destroyed to comply with the requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention, which the United States became a party to in 1997. The stockpile at Newport is the first U.S. stockpile containing VX that will be destroyed by using neutralization a process that mixes hot water and sodium hydroxide (a caustic chemical) with VX to change the chemical composition to a less toxic form. The resulting by-product is a liquid wastewater commonly referred to as hydrolysate that consists mostly of water but also has a caustic component and organic salts that need further treatment to meet Chemical Weapons Convention requirements and to meet federal and state environmental requirements for disposal. The John Warner National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 20075 mandated that we review the Army's Cost-Benefit Analysis of Off-Site Versus On-Site Treatment and Disposal of Newport Caustic Hydrolysate. Specifically, we (1) assessed the reasonableness of the Army's rationale to eliminate five of the eight technologies for treating Newport's hydrolysate; (2) determined what other options the Army considered, such as incineration; and (3) evaluated the adequacy of the cost comparison analysis presented for the three remaining technologies considered as alternatives to the Army's proposed plan. To meet the December 1, 2006, due date, we briefed or offered to brief your offices prior to that time. This report provides details of our findings and our conclusions and recommendations. We will also issue a separate letter on our assessment of the Army's cost-benefit analysis once DOD has completed its sensitivity review of the data in that letter. Report to the Congressional Committees.