DOD Supply Chain: Suspect Counterfeit Electronic Parts Can Be Found on Internet Purchasing Platforms

Counterfeit parts generally the misrepresentation of parts identity or pedigree have the potential to seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, delay missions, affect the integrity of weapon systems, and ultimately endanger the lives of our troops. Almost anything is at risk of...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Hillman, Richard J, Persons, Timothy, Barnes, Cindy B, Bianchi, Gary, Chanley, Virginia, Fauber, Dennis, Lewish, Barbara, McDermott, Jeffrey, McMullen, Maria, Perteet, Kimberly
Format: Report
Language:English
Subjects:
ACCESS
Administration and Management
AVAILABILITY
BARRIERS
CHAINS
COMPANY LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS
CONTRACTORS
DELAY
Electrical and Electronic Equipment
ELECTRONIC EQUIPMENT
FASTENINGS
GUIDANCE
GUIDED MISSILES
MILITARY PERSONNEL
MISSIONS
NETWORKS
PARTS
PERSONNEL
PLATFORMS
PROCUREMENT
RISK
SUPPLIES
WEAPON SYSTEMS
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Summary:Counterfeit parts generally the misrepresentation of parts identity or pedigree have the potential to seriously disrupt the Department of Defense (DOD) supply chain, delay missions, affect the integrity of weapon systems, and ultimately endanger the lives of our troops. Almost anything is at risk of being counterfeited, from fasteners used on aircraft to electronics used on missile guidance systems. There can be many sources of counterfeit parts as DOD draws from a large network of global suppliers. In 2011, we reported that the increase in counterfeit electronic parts is one of several potential barriers DOD faces in addressing parts quality problems. More recently, you asked about the availability of counterfeit parts on Internet platforms commonly used to buy hard-to-find militarygrade electronic parts, including those used in weapon systems. In a November testimony, we summarized preliminary observations from our investigation into the purchase and authenticity testing of selected, military-grade electronic parts that may enter the DOD supply chain.3 In conducting this investigation, we created a fictitious company to gain access to Internet platforms that provide access to vendors selling military-grade electronic parts. Our company included a fictitious owner and employees, mailing and e-mail addresses, a website, and a listing on the Central Contractor Registration.4 We attempted to purchase memberships to three Internet platforms that were of interest to this committee. One platform granted us membership despite not receiving all requested supporting documentation, the second granted us membership after we supplied the requested documentation as well as fictitious business references, and the third denied our request for membership even after we provided all documentation and references. None of the platforms contacted our references. We then requested quotes from vendors on both platforms to purchase a total of 16 parts from three categories: (1) authent