Buyer-Optimal Learning and Monopoly Pricing

This paper analyzes a bilateral trade model where the buyer's valuation for the object is uncertain and she observes only a signal about her valuation. The seller gives a take-it-or-leave-it offer to the buyer. Our goal is to characterize those signal structures which maximize the buyer's...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The American economic review 2017-07, Vol.107 (7), p.2072-2080
Main Authors: Roesler, Anne-Katrin, Szentes, Balázs
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Auctions
Buyers
Cumulative distribution functions
Economic models
Economic theory
Educational outcomes
International trade
Learning
Market prices
Monopolies
Monopoly
Prices
Pricing policies
Producer surplus
Shorter Papers
Total surplus
Trade
Valuation
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