Executive Compensation: A Modern Primer

This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a simple unifying framework accessible to the general-interest reader. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral-hazard models of incentives, and compare...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of economic literature 2016-12, Vol.54 (4), p.1232-1287
Main Authors: Edmans, Alex, Gabaix, Xavier
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Chief executives
Compensation
Corporate governance
Economic theory
Economics
Executive compensation
Executives (Business)
Extraction
Incentives
Labor economics
Management science
Moral hazard
Political economy
Stock options
Stockholders
Theory
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