A theory of elite-biased democracies

• Published in: Mathematical social sciences 2021-07, Vol.112, p.159-166
• Main Authors: Boucekkine, Raouf, Desbordes, Rodolphe, Melindi-Ghidi, Paolo
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Autocracy; Bias; Democracy; Democratization; Diabetes; Economic favouritism; Economics and Finance; Elite-biased democracy; Elites; Humanities and Social Sciences; Inequality; Institutional change; Minority & ethnic groups; Minority groups; Minority/majority; Political majority; Political transition; Politics; Redistribution; Revolution
• ISSN: 0165-4896; 1879-3118
• DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2021.03.007

Elite-biased democracies are those democracies in which former political incumbents and their allies coordinate to impose part of the autocratic institutional rules in the new political regime. We document that this type of democratic transition is much more prevalent than the emergence of pure (popular) democracies in which the majority decides the new institutional rules. We then develop a theoretical model explaining how an elite-biased democracy may arise in an initially autocratic country. To this end, we extend the benchmark political transition model of Acemoglu and Robinson (2005) along two essential directions. First, population is split into majority versus minority groups under the initial autocratic regime. Second, the minority is an insider as it benefits from a more favourable redistribution by the autocrat. We derive conditions under which elite-biased democracies emerge and characterise them, in particular with respect to pure democracies. •We develop a theory linking insider minorities and institutional change.•We explain how elite-biased democracies arise in autocratic countries.•Conditions favouring either elite-biased or pure democracies diverge.•The majority accepts elite-biased democracies if revolution costs are high.