Loading…
Does Analyst Coverage Impede Long-Term Investments? Evidence from Health and Safety Programs
This paper studies the linkage between analyst coverage and Health and Safety (H&S) programs, which have started to emerge in U. S. firms to improve employee health and control healthcare expenditures. Given their homogeneity across firms, their well-documented profitability and long-term payoff...
Saved in:
Published in: | Comptabilité Contrôle Audit 2021-05, Vol.27 (2), p.41-73, Article 41-73 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | This paper studies the linkage between analyst coverage and Health and Safety (H&S) programs, which have started to emerge in U. S. firms to improve employee health and control healthcare expenditures. Given their homogeneity across firms, their well-documented profitability and long-term payoffs, H&S programs provide an interesting setting to revisit the effect of analyst coverage on long-term investments. We find a strong and negative association between analyst coverage and H&S programs. An instrumental variable approach suggests that the effect of analyst coverage is causal. Cross-sectional analysis indicates that the effect of analyst coverage is more pronounced for firms with a high cost of H&S programs relative to earnings, low blockholder ownership or low long-term investor ownership, and with a low distance of realized earnings to analysts' earnings forecasts. Overall, these results lend empirical support to the view that analyst coverage deters long-term investments in H&S programs by exerting pressure on managers to meet short-term earnings forecasts. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1262-2788 2313-514X |
DOI: | 10.3917/cca.272.0041 |