Side-channel Attacks on Memristive Circuits Under External Disturbances

• Main Authors: Chen, Li-Wei, Zhao, Xianyue, Chen, Ziang, Du, Nan, Polian, Ilia
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Subjects: Closed box; External disturbances; Information leakage; Magnetic fields; Memristors; Neural networks; Side-channel analysis; Side-channel attacks; System-on-chip
• ISSN: 2377-5386
• DOI: 10.1109/ATS59501.2023.10317969

Quick progress in memristive technologies has led to their consideration for several potential applications, many of which are security-critical. New possibilities of memristors, including their unique combination of non-volatile storage and compute capabilities, make them particularly attractive to edge applications, which are physically exposed to their users and therefore to potential attackers. Therefore, practical deployment of memristive circuitry for, e.g., cryptographic (sub-)modules or on-chip neural network inference, is only feasible when their vulnerability to physical attacks is understood and addressed. We evaluate experimentally one relevant class of physical attacks, namely side-channel attacks, under varying external conditions, namely temperature and magnetic fields. Using a small cryptographic construction, we evaluate both white-box and black-box attack varieties, using respective cryptanalytic techniques. Our results show that, while non-nominal conditions can complicate attacks, the information leakage remains and the secrets are extractable with additional knowledge about the memristive devices. This suggests the need to consider possible external disturbances during security evaluation.