Physical Layer Authentication via Underwater Acoustic Multipath Channel Crafting

With the increasing number of actors in the under-water environment and the development of new applications, such as large-scale monitoring and autonomous underwater vehicle control, securing underwater communications is becoming a primary necessity. Security was not prioritized in the past due to t...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Eccher, Davide, Casari, Paolo
Format: Conference Proceeding
Language:English
Subjects:
Authentication
channel crafting
Channel estimation
Cryptography
Delays
Estimation error
History
Multipath channels
performance evaluation
physical layer security
Protocols
simulation
Transmitters
Underwater acoustic networks
Underwater acoustics
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Summary:With the increasing number of actors in the under-water environment and the development of new applications, such as large-scale monitoring and autonomous underwater vehicle control, securing underwater communications is becoming a primary necessity. Security was not prioritized in the past due to the constraints of underwater acoustic communications, which cannot sustain the overhead of typical cryptographic techniques. In this paper, we propose a method to authenticate a network device by exploiting the physical properties of the acoustic channel. In particular, our method hinges on the uniqueness and quasi-reciprocity of the channel, from which the authenticator (Alice) node can extract several parameters such as the number of multi path channel components, their delay and amplitude. These values are similar on both ends of a link between Alice and a legitimate transmitter (Bob), and can be used as a seed to craft a new artificial channel, that is then applied to transmissions from Bob to Alice. With this procedure, Alice can distinguish Bob from an impersonating attacker (Eve), given a previous message exchange history. Eve can try to bypass the protocol by estimating the channel parameters and by trying to replicate Bob's signal by crafting a similar channel. In our tests, we observe that the estimation error for Eve, caused by her wrong channel estimates, becomes significant even for short distances betwen Eve and Bob. This error results in a discrepancy between the signal generated by Eve and the one expected by Alice, and reveals Eve as an attacker.
ISSN:2996-1882
DOI:10.1109/OCEANS55160.2024.10753810