Hardware Implementation of a Hybrid Dynamic Gold Code-Based Countermeasure Against Side-Channel Attacks

• Main Authors: Tran, Thai-Ha, Dam, Duc-Thuan, Kieu-Do-Nguyen, Binh, Hoang, Van-Phuc, Hoang, Trong-Thuc, Pham, Cong-Kha
• Format: Conference Proceeding
• Language: English
• Subjects: Countermeasure; Gold; horizontal hiding; Proposals; Protection; random number generator; Registers; Resistance; Ring generators; Ring oscillators; Side-channel attacks; Table lookup
• ISSN: 2643-4202
• DOI: 10.1109/PST62714.2024.10788048

Side-channel attacks have emerged as the predominant approach for exploiting the weaknesses of cryptographic equipment. Therefore, it is becoming increasingly necessary to prioritize countermeasures that can improve the security level of these implementations. A Mixed-Mode Clock Manager (MMCM) primitive has been utilized in several time-based hiding countermeasures against side-channel attacks. However, they cannot be applied to ASIC implementations because the MMCM is a Xilinx primitive. Consequently, this paper proposes a hybrid dynamic Gold code-based solution to generate multiple different frequencies. The countermeasure combines a pair of preferred polynomials with one ring oscillator, so it is suitable for both FPGA and ASIC designs. The hardware overhead of our suggested architecture is 1.007× and 1.009× in terms of slice LUTs and registers, respectively. The total area cost of the circuit on the CMOS 0.18 um process is 398,835 square micrometers, representing a 1.004x increase compared to the unprotected case. Moreover, the approach is resistant to both standard and sliding window-based Correlation Power Analysis attacks, even when employing UP to one million power traces.