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A Hierarchical Control Framework With a Novel Bidding Scheme for Residential Community Energy Optimization
Residential energy optimization provides economic and reliability benefits to the electric utility and consumers. Two major challenges in community energy optimization are: 1) to efficiently coordinate among a large number of residential consumers' electric appliances and 2) to ensure participa...
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Published in: | IEEE transactions on smart grid 2020-01, Vol.11 (1), p.710-719 |
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Main Authors: | , , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Residential energy optimization provides economic and reliability benefits to the electric utility and consumers. Two major challenges in community energy optimization are: 1) to efficiently coordinate among a large number of residential consumers' electric appliances and 2) to ensure participating consumers are comfortable and are rewarded with financial incentives during demand reduction. This paper proposes a hierarchical control framework with a novel bidding scheme that manages the use of consumers' electric appliances while satisfying utility demand reduction requests. A new demand reduction bidding strategy is introduced for the efficient coordination among several local controllers (LCs) under a central controller (CC) in the proposed framework. Incentives are provided to the residential consumers for their participation, while considering their preferences, using a continuous reward structure. A simulation study on the 6-bus Roy Billinton test system with 1200 residential consumers demonstrates the financial benefits to the electric utility and consumers by performing a 6% demand reduction during peak times. The results show that the utility saves 28217, and a residential consumer earns 9.37 on average for a one-hour demand reduction event (e.g., reducing 1.2 MW peak power). The reward scheme designed from this framework is more economical to utilities compared to existing utility reward schemes. |
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ISSN: | 1949-3053 1949-3061 |
DOI: | 10.1109/TSG.2019.2927928 |