Low-level implementation and side-channel detection of stealthy hardware trojans on field programmable gate arrays

Hardware Trojans (HTs) are an emerging threat for integrated circuits integrity and their applications. Trying to find efficient HT detection methods is necessary. However, before detecting them, HTs need to be created with an efficient method and their effects need to be understood. There are very...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Chronic diseases and translational medicine 2014-11, Vol.8 (6), p.246-255
Main Authors: Marchand, Cédric, Francq, Julien
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
automated export system
Circuit design
Circuits
Classification
Computer information security
cryptography
Design
Field programmable gate arrays
Hardware
hardware security
Heat treatment
HT detection methods
Infections
integrated circuits integrity
layout level
noninfected circuit
Scripts
side‐channel detection
Special Issue: Hardware Security
stealthy hardware trojans
Taxonomy
trust‐hub Web site
Citations: Items that this one cites
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Description
Summary:Hardware Trojans (HTs) are an emerging threat for integrated circuits integrity and their applications. Trying to find efficient HT detection methods is necessary. However, before detecting them, HTs need to be created with an efficient method and their effects need to be understood. There are very few studies which describe HTs implementation methods and the methods used are not convenient for systematic study of HTs effects. The Trust-Hub website, known for hardware security in general, had published a full HT implementation tutorial, which is not completely satisfying. This study proposes a stealthy and reusable HT implementation method on field programmable gate arrays at the layout level adapted for the study of different HTs with the same non-infected circuit. Created for a systematic study of the effects brought by different HTs, the proposed approach allows designers to insert stealthy HTs inside the same circuit in order to create different realistic infected circuits. HTs implementation results on an advance encryption standard system and detection experiments based on side-channel are also presented in this study. The implementation method the authors propose can be used with scripts in order to accelerate the insertions of HTs variants.
ISSN:1751-8601
1751-861X
2095-882X
1751-861X
2589-0514
DOI:10.1049/iet-cdt.2014.0034