EPISTEMOLOGY, SEMANTICS, AND SELF-REFERENCE

The generally held view in semantics is that, for communication to take place, meanings must be shared, presuming a communality of experience between communicators. Recent advances in epistemology suggest that such communality is neither proven, nor credible. Alternative concepts of the mechanisms b...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Journal of cybernetics 1980-04, Vol.10 (4), p.313-339
Main Author: PEDRETTI, ANNETTA
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:The generally held view in semantics is that, for communication to take place, meanings must be shared, presuming a communality of experience between communicators. Recent advances in epistemology suggest that such communality is neither proven, nor credible. Alternative concepts of the mechanisms by which communication can take place have been developed and the properties of the relationships between such indications as can be observed and the distinctions they indicate have been explored. This paper considers the possibility of an ontogenetic theory of meaning, which, without requiring communality of experience, can nevertheless explain the possibility of communication.
ISSN:0022-0280
DOI:10.1080/01969728008927652