In the shadow of the dragon: Doctrine and the US army after Vietnam

Until this century, United States military doctrine was implied rather than set dawn, irregular and pragmatic as circumstances dictated. All this changed after Vietnam, But how was that change effected in an atmosphere of destroyed credibility and loss of vision? Here Professor Spiller explores the...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:RUSI Journal 1997-12, Vol.142 (6), p.41-54
Main Author: Spiller, Roger J
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Armed forces
DePuy, William
History
Military training
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Summary:Until this century, United States military doctrine was implied rather than set dawn, irregular and pragmatic as circumstances dictated. All this changed after Vietnam, But how was that change effected in an atmosphere of destroyed credibility and loss of vision? Here Professor Spiller explores the background to the rebirth of the US military in the post-Vietnam era, through the work of the man who created the new warfighting doctrine-General William DePuy. He traces the evolution of DePuy's beliefs and his determination to create, through the new Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) a new vision of the Army led initially by a commitment to training. Following the Arab-Israeli War of 1973, the focus shifted more to the rote of doctrine and provided the excuse needed to thoroughly review US doctrine in the light of real developments untainted by the Vietnam experience. DePuy's autocratic nature and firm self-belief may have resulted in an ultimately flawed product, but Professor Spiller concludes, no-one else made such a lasting contribution to the role of doctrine, placing it in the centre of reform and ensuring that the US Army became a doctrine-led organisation.
ISSN:0307-1847
1744-0378
DOI:10.1080/03071849708446210