Foreign Intelligence Liaison: Devils, Deals, and Details

• Published in: International journal of intelligence and counterintelligence 2006-05, Vol.19 (2), p.195-217
• Main Author: Sims, Jennifer E.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Exchange (Economics); Intelligence; Pakistan; Political Parties; Risk; Secrecy; Terrorism; United States of America; War
• ISSN: 0885-0607; 1521-0561
• DOI: 10.1080/08850600500483657

This paper begins by reviewing the history & nature of bilateral & multilateral liaison in foreign intelligence. The different forms such liaison can take are enumerated -- simple or complex, symmetric or asymmetric, & even adversarial. An examination of its costs & benefits points out that liaison can spread the costs & risks of intelligence collection operations among the parties in liaison. Each party can contribute what it does best; eg, the US is best at technical operations & might barter this in exchange for human source reporting. The primary drawback is the lack of total control of the intelligence gathered. Can the other party be trusted, especially in covert actions? This is particularly true in complex liaisons that involve swapping sensitive data. Based on this review, recommendations are made for the use of liaison in US conduct of the war on terror. Liaison relationships are an increasingly important source of intelligence that can be used against terrorism: the more eyes & ears, the greater the accuracy of the intelligence. However, secure liaison relations are not cheap to maintain, especially in counter-intelligence. US intelligence is currently maintaining multiple adversarial & asymmetrical relations (one of the latter being with Pakistan), which is dangerous but necessary to prevent terrorist acts. US intelligence vulnerabilities are noted. It is concluded that the US must balance its dependency on liaisons with renewed commitment to collection assets as well as deepening secrecy within our nation of its own intelligence. J. Stanton