Do Judges' Delegations Affect Judicial Performance? A Transition Economy Evidence

The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Justice system journal 2020-11, Vol.41 (4), p.344-359
Main Authors: Staszkiewicz, Piotr, Morawska, Sylwia, Banasik, Przemysław, Witkowski, Bartosz, Staszkiewicz, Richard
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
delegation
Delegation of authority
efficiency
judge's independence
Poland
political impact
Research Article
Transition economies
transition economy
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:The aim of this study is to discern whether, by delegating judges from the court to the Ministry of Justice, the Minister of Justice influences the results of courts in terms of adjudication. The study used a unique set of data for the Polish judicial system over a period of five years. The research results indicate that there are three reasons for delegating judges. Firstly, the delegation system serves to fill staff shortages among administrative staff at the Ministry of Justice. Secondly, the delegation system allows for inefficient judges to be moved. Thirdly, the system serves as an indirect control mechanism affecting the independence of courts. The results show that delegation has a positive short-term impact on judicial performance.
ISSN:0098-261X
2327-7556
DOI:10.1080/0098261X.2020.1843092