Robust satisfying voting: why are uncertain voters biased towards sincerity?

The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Public choice 2010-10, Vol.145 (1/2), p.265-280
Main Authors: Davidovitch, Lior, Ben-Haim, Yakov
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Critical values
Electoral systems
Expected utility
Honesty
Marginal utility
Plurality voting
Political candidates
Preferential voting
Voting
Voting paradox
Online Access:Get full text
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Summary:The modern theory of voting usually regards voters as expected utility maximizers. This implies that voters define subjective probabilities and utilities for different outcomes of the elections. In real life, these probabilities and utilities are often highly uncertain, so a robust choice, immune to erroneous assumptions, may be preferred. We show that a voter aiming to satisfice his expected utility, rather than maximize it, may present a bias for sincere voting, as opposed to strategic voting. This may explain previous results which show that strategic voting is not as prevalent as would be expected if all voters were expected utility maximizers.
ISSN:0048-5829
1573-7101