Governance Under Common Ownership

Conventional wisdom is that diversification weakens governance by spreading investors too thinly. We show that, when investors own multiple firms (“common ownership”), governance through both voice and exit can strengthen—even if the firms are in unrelated industries. Under common ownership, informe...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:The Review of financial studies 2019-07, Vol.32 (7), p.2673-2719
Main Authors: Edmans, Alex, Levit, Doron, Reilly, Devin
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Companies
Diversification
Electronic publishing
Governance
Incentives
Internet
Investors
Ownership
Prices
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