A CCA2 Secure Variant of the McEliece Cryptosystem

The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Different from RSA and ElGamal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even though McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encry...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:IEEE transactions on information theory 2012-10, Vol.58 (10), p.6672-6680
Main Authors: Dottling, N., Dowsley, R., Muller-Quade, J., Nascimento, A. C. A.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Applied sciences
CCA2 security
Coding theory
Coding, codes
Computer information security
Construction
Construction standards
Cryptography
Data encryption
Encryption
Exact sciences and technology
Games
Information theory
Information, signal and communications theory
McEliece assumptions
Probabilistic logic
Public key
public-key encryption
Quantum computers
Signal and communications theory
standard model
Telecommunications and information theory
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Summary:The McEliece public-key encryption scheme has become an interesting alternative to cryptosystems based on number-theoretical problems. Different from RSA and ElGamal, McEliece PKC is not known to be broken by a quantum computer. Moreover, even though McEliece PKC has a relatively big key size, encryption and decryption operations are rather efficient. In spite of all the recent results in coding-theory-based cryptosystems, to the date, there are no constructions secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model-the de facto security notion for public-key cryptosystems. In this paper, we show the first construction of a McEliece-based public-key cryptosystem secure against chosen ciphertext attacks in the standard model. Our construction is inspired by a recently proposed technique by Rosen and Segev.
ISSN:0018-9448
1557-9654
DOI:10.1109/TIT.2012.2203582