Game theory, conditional preferences, and social influence

Neoclassical noncooperative game theory is based on a simple, yet powerful synthesis of mathematical and logical concepts: unconditional and immutable preference orderings and individual rationality. Although this structure has proven useful for characterizing competitive multi-player behavior, its...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:PloS one 2013-02, Vol.8 (2), p.e56751-e56751
Main Authors: Stirling, Wynn C, Felin, Teppo
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Analysis
Competitive Behavior
Computer Science
Cooperation
Cooperative Behavior
Decision making
Economic theory
Embedding
Expected utility
Functions (mathematics)
Game Theory
Humans
Interpersonal Relations
Mathematics
Models, Theoretical
Preferences
Rationality
Self interest
Social and Behavioral Sciences
Social aspects
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Summary:Neoclassical noncooperative game theory is based on a simple, yet powerful synthesis of mathematical and logical concepts: unconditional and immutable preference orderings and individual rationality. Although this structure has proven useful for characterizing competitive multi-player behavior, its applicability to scenarios involving complex social relationships is problematic. In this paper we directly address this limitation by the introduction of a conditional preference structure that permits players to modulate their preference orderings as functions of the preferences of other players. Embedding this expanded preference structure in a formal and graphical framework provides a systematic approach for characterizing a complex society. The result is an influence network that allows conditional preferences to propagate through the community, resulting in an emergent social model which characterizes all of the social relationships that exist and which leads to solution concepts that account for both group and individual interests. The Ultimatum game is presented as an example of how social influence can be modeled with conditional preferences.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0056751