Analytical cryptanalysis upon N = p2q utilizing Jochemsz-May strategy

This paper presents a cryptanalytic approach on the variants of the RSA which utilizes the modulus N = p2q where p and q are balanced large primes. Suppose [Formula: see text] satisfying gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1 where ϕ(N) = p(p - 1)(q - 1) and d < Nδ be its multiplicative inverse. From ed - kϕ(N) = 1, b...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:PloS one 2021, Vol.16 (3), p.e0248888-e0248888
Main Authors: Adenan, Nurul Nur Hanisah, Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal, Yunos, Faridah, Sapar, Siti Hasana, Asbullah, Muhammad Asyraf
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Algorithms
Computer and Information Sciences
Cryptography
Editing
Mathematical analysis
Mathematics
Physical Sciences
Research and Analysis Methods
Security
Vectors (mathematics)
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Summary:This paper presents a cryptanalytic approach on the variants of the RSA which utilizes the modulus N = p2q where p and q are balanced large primes. Suppose [Formula: see text] satisfying gcd(e, ϕ(N)) = 1 where ϕ(N) = p(p - 1)(q - 1) and d < Nδ be its multiplicative inverse. From ed - kϕ(N) = 1, by utilizing the extended strategy of Jochemsz and May, our attack works when the primes share a known amount of Least Significant Bits(LSBs). This is achievable since we obtain the small roots of our specially constructed integer polynomial which leads to the factorization of N. More specifically we show that N can be factored when the bound [Formula: see text]. Our attack enhances the bound of some former attacks upon N = p2q.
ISSN:1932-6203
1932-6203
DOI:10.1371/journal.pone.0248888