Loading…
Research on differential game strategy of debt restructuring supported by government
This paper studies the debt restructuring equilibrium decision problem composed of creditors and debt enterprises with the participation of the government and asset management companies. With the differential game, the dynamic optimization models of debt restructuring under three situations: central...
Saved in:
Published in: | PloS one 2023-04, Vol.18 (4), p.e0284044-e0284044 |
---|---|
Main Authors: | , , |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Subjects: | |
Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Summary: | This paper studies the debt restructuring equilibrium decision problem composed of creditors and debt enterprises with the participation of the government and asset management companies. With the differential game, the dynamic optimization models of debt restructuring under three situations: centralized decision-making, decentralized decision-making, and Stackelberg game after introducing cost-sharing contract are constructed, respectively. The optimal equilibrium strategy of debt restructuring, the optimal trajectory of debt restructuring synergy, and the optimal profit under three decision-making situations are investigated and compared. It is found that the synergy effect and total profit of debt restructuring are the highest under centralized decision-making, and the Stackelberg game is superior to decentralized decision-making, which shows that the cost-sharing contract can achieve the coordination of overall interests, improve the debt restructuring environment, and promote the debt restructuring process. Finally, the sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters is carried out through an example, which verifies the effectiveness of the conclusion and provides the scientific basis for the government and asset management companies to participate in debt restructuring successfully. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1932-6203 1932-6203 |
DOI: | 10.1371/journal.pone.0284044 |