Political competition between differentiated candidates

We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Games and economic behavior 2012-09, Vol.76 (1), p.249-271
Main Authors: Krasa, Stefan, Polborn, Mattias K.
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Elections
Equilibrium
Multidimensional policy
Political competition
Preferences
Probability
Studies
Utility functions
Voter behavior
Voting
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Summary:We introduce a framework of electoral competition in which voters have general preferences over candidatesʼ immutable characteristics (such as gender, race or previously committed policy positions) as well as their policy positions, which are flexible. Candidates are uncertain about the distribution of voter preferences and choose policy positions to maximize their winning probability. We characterize a property of voter utility functions (“uniform candidate ranking”, UCR) that captures a form of separability between fixed characteristics and policy. When voters have UCR preferences, candidatesʼ equilibrium policies converge in any strict equilibrium. In contrast, notions like competence or complementarity lead to non-UCR preferences and policy divergence. In particular, we introduce a new class of models that contains the probabilistic voting model as a special case and in which there is a unique equilibrium that generically features policy divergence. ► We study electoral competition when voters care about candidatesʼ fixed characteristics and flexible policy positions. ► “UCR preferences” capture a form of separability between fixed characteristics and policy. ► If voters have UCR preferences, candidatesʼ equilibrium policies converge in any strict equilibrium. ► Complementarity between candidate characteristics and policies leads to non-UCR preferences and policy divergence.
ISSN:0899-8256
1090-2473
DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2012.05.003