Corporate visibility and executive pay

This paper seeks evidence of implicit regulation of executive pay. The implicit regulation hypothesis suggests highly visible companies will constrain their behavior to avoid potential reprisals from constituents, politicians and potential regulators. We extend this literature using a measure of cor...

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Bibliographic Details
Published in:Economics letters 2012-10, Vol.117 (1), p.337-339
Main Authors: Rayton, Bruce A., Brammer, Stephen, Cheng, Suwina
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Companies
Corporate culture
Evidence
Executive compensation
Implicit regulation
Incentive pay
Literature
Media coverage
Organizational behavior
Political behavior
Regulation
Studies
Visibility
Working papers
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