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The logic of Obligation and the obligations of the logician
Moral philosophers have sometimes claimed to deduce particular duties from the very nature of obligation. It would now be agreed by most that this cannot be done; and with this general view I have no serious quarrel. Yet there are1 forms of reasoning which in some sense owe their cogency to the very...
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Published in: | Synthese (Dordrecht) 2012-10, Vol.188 (3), p.423-448 |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
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Citations: | Items that this one cites Items that cite this one |
Online Access: | Get full text |
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Summary: | Moral philosophers have sometimes claimed to deduce particular duties from the very nature of obligation. It would now be agreed by most that this cannot be done; and with this general view I have no serious quarrel. Yet there are1 forms of reasoning which in some sense owe their cogency to the very nature of obligation2. For example, if it is not possible to do A without doing B, we may infer that if it is permissible to do A, then it is permissible to do B. Possible is a notoriously ambiguous word; so let it be understood that bare logical possibility is intended. |
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ISSN: | 0039-7857 1573-0964 |
DOI: | 10.1007/s11229-011-9935-3 |