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The logic of Obligation and the obligations of the logician

Moral philosophers have sometimes claimed to deduce particular duties from the very nature of obligation. It would now be agreed by most that this cannot be done; and with this general view I have no serious quarrel. Yet there are1 forms of reasoning which in some sense owe their cogency to the very...

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Published in:Synthese (Dordrecht) 2012-10, Vol.188 (3), p.423-448
Main Author: Prior, A. N.
Format: Article
Language:English
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Summary:Moral philosophers have sometimes claimed to deduce particular duties from the very nature of obligation. It would now be agreed by most that this cannot be done; and with this general view I have no serious quarrel. Yet there are1 forms of reasoning which in some sense owe their cogency to the very nature of obligation2. For example, if it is not possible to do A without doing B, we may infer that if it is permissible to do A, then it is permissible to do B. Possible is a notoriously ambiguous word; so let it be understood that bare logical possibility is intended.
ISSN:0039-7857
1573-0964
DOI:10.1007/s11229-011-9935-3