Strategically superfluous, unacceptably overpriced: The case against Canada's F-35A Lightning II acquisition

Defence Minister Peter MacKay's July 2010 decision to procure the developmentally lagging F-35 was reportedly driven by aerospace industrial development hopes at the political level, and aspirations in the senior ranks of the Canadian military that Lockheed Martin (LM) would indeed deliver a fi...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:Canadian foreign policy journal 2011-09, Vol.17 (3), p.239-250
Main Authors: Bezglasnyy, Anton, Ross, Douglas Alan
Format: Article
Language:English
Subjects:
Airplanes
Canada
Competition
Defence Procurement
Defense spending
F-35 Lightning II
Foreign Policy
Industrial Development
International Relations
Military aircraft
Military policy
Military strategy
Platform
Radar
Citations: Items that this one cites
Items that cite this one
Online Access:Get full text
Tags: Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
Description
Summary:Defence Minister Peter MacKay's July 2010 decision to procure the developmentally lagging F-35 was reportedly driven by aerospace industrial development hopes at the political level, and aspirations in the senior ranks of the Canadian military that Lockheed Martin (LM) would indeed deliver a fiscally viable aircraft. Such hopes are unlikely to be fulfilled. The aircraft is strategically inappropriate for Canada, and comes with too great opportunity costs. The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) design entailed too many complex advances at one time. Any F-35 aircraft purchased are likely to be a source of chronic problems and expensive maintenance. The single-engine F-35 is, in comparison with upgraded fourth-generation competitors, not well suited for its primary Canadian strategic role in continental air defence. Further, the JSF would be militarily redundant in overseas allied missions. Less costly, operationally proven platforms such as the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, the F-15C 'Golden Eagle' or the Eurofighter Typhoon equipped with the latest Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radars and advanced missiles are preferable. JSF acquisition by Ottawa would result in too few aircraft with less capability in the continental air defence role. Only an open competition is likely to produce an optimal selection able to meet Canada's highest defence priority.
ISSN:1192-6422
2157-0817
DOI:10.1080/11926422.2011.638192