Beyond Nuclear Deterrence: the concept of a retributive policy

• Published in: Journal of applied philosophy 1987-10, Vol.4 (2), p.135-153
• Main Author: MYERS, DAVID B.
• Format: Article
• Language: English
• Subjects: Criminal culpability; Criminals; Human aggression; Military strategy; Nuclear deterrence; Nuclear weapons; Retaliation; Retributive justice; War; Weapons
• ISSN: 0264-3758; 1468-5930
• DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-5930.1987.tb00212.x

The primary aim of the paper is to apply the concept of retribution to nuclear defence policy. Nuclear defence policy, as I conceive it, is concerned with addressing the threat Soviet nuclear weapons pose for Western security. I argue that, contrary to popular opinion, MAD is not a retributive doctrine—that in fact it violates two constitutive principles of retribution: culpability and proportionality. After explicating these constitutive principles, I apply them to retaliatory strategy—showing that the culpability criterion restricts retaliation to the agents of aggression while the proportionality criterion requires a just measure of retaliation. The result is a defence policy continuous with the just war tradition—one which rules out deterrence based on threats against the civilian population. I show why a retributive policy requires non-nuclear forces and discuss the feasiblity of replacing all nuclear forces with conventional weapons. I anticipate and answer major objections to the denuclearization of U.S. and NATO forces. Finally, I conclude that an advocate of a retributive policy—specifically, a policy calling for a proportional or measured response against combatants only—must be willing, in the name of justice, to accept the risk of making war more thinkable by making it less horrible.